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CONCEIVING FOR CASH; IS IT LEGAL?: A SURVEY




As early as 1980, when news of the first surrogate mother-
hood agreements made headlines, legal and medical practition-
ers involved in the deals emphasized the urgent need for state
regulatory legislation of the practice.' Since then, the number of
births per year resulting from these arrangements has continued
to increase 2 along with the prevalence of other new techniques to
assist in human procreation such as in vitro fertilization, embryo
transfer, and cryopreservation of embryos, all of which may in-
volve the use of a non-related woman either as a carrier or
mother of an artificially produced child. While the subject of
"brave new world" reproductive techniques has certainly cap-
tured the media's attention and aroused public awareness, state
legislators have been slow to respond to the recommendation of
legal and medical practitioners in this field to produce the type
of comprehensive legislation which will eliminate the legal limbo
in which the participants in the new reproductive technologies
have been mired. Although new legislation may be advocated by
legislators in a majority of states, it is clear that passage of such
laws is not a priority on most state legislative agendas.' In the
* Shereen Taylor received her J.D. degree in 1983 from the University of Chicago
and is an associate with the law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois.
1. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L. J. 147; Black,
Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373 (1981) [hereinafter
Black].
2. Although exact numbers are unavailable, estimates are that between 500 and 600
surrogate births have been arranged by formal contracts. See Peterson, Surrogates,
Finding No Laws Often Improvise Birth Pacts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1987, at C2, col. 1.
3. For a detailed analysis of the proposals, see Andrews, "The Aftermath of Baby M:
Proposed State Laws on Surrogate Motherhood," 17 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 31 (Octo-
ber 1987) [hereinafter HASTINGS REPORT]. See also Lorio, Alternative Means of Repro-
duction: Virgin Territory For Legislation, 44LA. L. REV. 1641, 1659-60 (1984); Freed, As
Surrogate Parenting Increases, States Must Resolve Legal Issues, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 22,
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meantime, state courts are being asked to adjudicate the rights
of the parties in these transactions, and existing laws are being
used to resolve questions once taken for granted such as, "who is
the mother?""
Until new laws are passed, the outcome of these cases will
be subject to existing state laws governing adoption, artificial in-
semination, paternity and custody. This article will analyze the
legal risks currently facing the participants in the reproduction
technologies using surrogate mothers, including the embryo
transfer procedure, and the state laws which may help or hinder
the desired outcome. Since regulatory legislation continues to be
debated, but not implemented, it is crucial that the participants
in both surrogate mother and surrogate carrier arrangements be
informed about existing laws and work within their parameters
to avoid unintended catastrophes.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY
The burgeoning use of the alternatives to natural procrea-
tion has resulted from increasing sophistication in medical tech-
nology as well as probable increase in the rate of infertility.'
Current statistics indicate that one in six persons of childbearing
age is infertile.' Half of these have been helped by traditional
infertility treatments with drugs or surgery, but the remaining
group is increasingly seeking a solution to their infertility
through use of assisted reproduction technologies. The matching
of sperm and ova by the various procedures known as artificial
insemination (AI), in vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo transfer
(ET) and surrogate mothering have become viable procreative
methods.
Artificial insemination is traditionally an option for a couple
where the male produces little or no sperm. His wife can be in-
1986, at 28.
4. See Sherwyn & Handel v. California State Dep't of Soc. Serv., 173 Cal. App. 3d 52,
218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1985). In the absence of legislation, some facilitators have unsuccess-
fully sought court declarations of the applicability of existing laws to surrogate
transactions.
5. Infertility rates have increased in younger married couples. Moster & Pratt, Re-
productive Impairments Among Married Couples: United States, Vital Health Statis-
tics 16 (1982)(Nat'l Center for Health Statistics) [hereinafter Moster and Pratt].
6. L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY
TREATMENTS 3, 16 (1984).
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seminated with sperm from a donor. Similarly, if the woman
cannot provide an egg, she can call on the aid of a female donor
to provide an egg, either as a surrogate mother (the woman pro-
vides the gestational as well as genetic material) or as a surro-
gate carrier (the woman provides only the gestational compo-
nent).' The donation of sperm or eggs or both can be done by
transferring the sperm or egg into the woman's body for fertili-
zation. In addition, an embryo already fertilized by artificial in-
semination may be transferred by a lavage procedure into the
uterus of another woman who will gestate the embryo.'
IVF is now the procedure of choice if a woman has blocked
or absent fallopian tubes or her partner has a low sperm count.
An egg is removed from the woman's ovary and fertilized with
the man's sperm in a petri dish. If fertilization occurs, the re-
sulting embryo is placed in the woman's uterus two days later.
All of these reproduction techniques allow one or both of
the rearing parents to have a biological bond to the child (ge-
netic, gestational, or both)-a factor often cited by infertile
couples who have turned to these new reproduction alterna-
tives.' Another stems from the shortage of babies available for
adoption.10 These factors combine to create a situation where
thousands of infertile couples are willing to participate in vari-
ous arrangements involving third parties in the reproductive
process without any legal protection of their respective interests.
It is the fact of involving a non-related third party and the emo-
tional bonding associated with a pregnancy which make the sur-
rogate process more risky.
In the majority of cases, the results have been successful
births and happy parents, but in the few which may fail, tragic
7. Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 336 (1981).
8. The first birth from such a procedure was announced on Feb. 3, 1984 at Harbor-
U.C.L.A. Medical Center. See Boys Birth is First From Embryo Transfer, Wash. Post,
Feb. 4, 1984, at A14, col. 1.
9. Effects of Surrogate Motherhood; Other Child-bearing Options Need Closer
Study Says Researcher, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 18, 1985, at 10. One may speculate,
however, that the genetic link is the tie that binds. Although a far less frequent practice,
embryo transfer, using surrogate carriers may prove more successful for this reason. No
incidences of a surrogate carrier refusing to give up a genetically unrelated child she
gestates have been reported.




consequences may result. These failures have been widely re-
ported by the press, arousing public awareness of the potential
problems with such arrangements. The first such case occurred
in California and involved an unpaid surrogate, Denise Bhimani,
who refused to relinquish the child to the father, James Noyes,
and his wife according to the contractual terms." The case was
settled out of court and Bhimani kept the child. Another case in
which a surrogate mother kept the child occured in Ohio and
never went to court." In February of 1983, Judy Stiver con-
tracted with William Malahoff and his wife to bear Mr.
Malahoff's child. Unfortunately, in the Malahoff case, the child
born to Judy Stiver was handicapped with microcephaly. Upon
learning this news, Malahoff refused to accept the child and
sued Stiver for breach of contract.' 3
The most recent headline-grabbing case is that involving
"Baby M. ' ' 14 Mary Beth Whitehead, a housewife and mother of
two children, contracted with Mr. William Stern and his wife to
conceive a child by artificial insemination using the sperm of
Mr. Stern, and to subsequently release the child to the Sterns.
After the birth, Whitehead refused to follow through on the con-
tract, prompting a bitter suit over the custody of "Baby M."
III. LAWS CURRENTLY APPLICABLE TO SURROGATE MOTHER
ARRANGEMENTS
A. The Typical Surrogate Contract
The facilitators of surrogate contracts take many precau-
tions in an attempt to ensure selection of a stable, mature wo-
11. Surrogate Mother Wins Custody of Baby, Wash. Post, June 5, 1981, at A6. See
also Galen, Surrogate Law, Nat'l L. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
12. Galen, supra note 11. Mother to Keep Baby, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, at Al,
col. 3. Surrogate Mom Feels Bad, But Won't Give Baby Away, Columbus Citizen J.,
Nov. 9, 1983, at 2 [hereinafter Surrogate Mom].
13. Surrogate Mom, supra note 12. Baby Doe Goes Home, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3,1983,
at A16, col. 1. Later tests indicated, however, that Stiver's husband, and not Malahoff,
was indeed the child's genetic father. Malahoff sued the Stivers claiming breach of the
contract, for although Stiver and her husband refrained from sexual intercourse after the
insemination as the contract required, they apparently had not during the prior week.
14. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), cert. granted, 107 N.J. 140,




man who is least likely to keep the child. For example, many
facilitators prefer to use married surrogates who have children of
their own, assuming that knowledge of the pregnancy experience
will decrease the woman's desire to keep the child.15 All require
the surrogate to undergo psychological testing and evaluation, as
well as a physical exam and genetic evaluation. The potential
parents then select a surrogate from a pool of pre-screened
women. In many cases, the couple and surrogate mother never
meet, but in others, very intimate relationships may develop be-
tween the parties.
Once a surrogate is selected, a physician will perform the
artificial insemination. If a pregnancy occurs, the surrogate is
usually paid a portion of her total compensation,"6 with the bal-
ance held in escrow pending the birth and consent to the child's
adoption by the wife of the sperm donor. According to some of
the early contracts, the surrogate was also required to adhere
strictly to all medical instructions given by the attending physi-
cian during the pregnancy.17 The couple is obligated to assume
the care and responsibility for the child regardless of any birth
defects.
Once the child is born, the surrogate formally terminates
her parental rights or consents to adoption of the child by the
wife of the sperm donor. This procedure is handled privately by
the facilitator, outside of a licensed adoption agency.
The surrogate carrier situation differs in that an adoption is
not pursued since the attending physician may simply place the
genetic mother's name on the birth certificate. In at least one
15. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 117 (1983) [hereinafter Parker].
16. Attorney Bill Handel has dealt with over 60 couples and surrogates at costs ex-
ceeding $20,000 each, which included the $10,000 service fee plus $4-6,000 in legal ex-
penses, $2,000 for psychological counseling, $1,000 for the insemination, $1,000 for life
insurance, and as much as $7,000 in medical expenses if the surrogate has no health
insurance. SURROGATE PARENTING NEWS 5 (April 1983).
17. The original contract used by the Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. of Ken-
tucky went so far as to incorporate a provision prohibiting the surrogate from smoking,
drinking alcoholic beverages, and using illegal drugs or non-prescription or prescribed
drugs unless consented to by the physician. See Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v.
Kentucky, 704 S.W. 2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986) [hereinafter Surrogate Agreement]. This type
of provision is inadvisable and probably unenforcable, given existing constitutional pro-
tections of a woman's choice not to bear a child. See Robertson, Procreation and the
Control of Conception, Pregnancy, Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 45 (1983).
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situation, the parental couple obtained a court declaration of pa-
ternity and maternity prior to the birth, subject to obtaining the
appropriate tissue matching tests after the birth as evidence."8
B. The Potential Problems
Since lawyers and doctors are venturing into this forum as
facilitators of the assisted reproduction techniques, they must be
informed about the potential risks of their endeavors, not only
to themselves, but to the other participants as well. The parties
embarking on this process enter it with the highest hope that it
will proceed according to the planned contract, but should the
arrangements run awry, the potentially applicable laws will not
adequately resolve the problems.
The legal issues raised by the surrogate mother arrangement
will vary from state to state, explaining in some measure why
facilitating clinics have flourished in some jurisdictions and not
in others. Fundamentally, the existing laws may dictate: (a)
whether the surrogate may be paid, (b) whether the contract is
enforceable, (c) whether a legal adoption by the non-related
mother is possible, and (d) whether the father and mother may
establish their paternity and maternity, respectively. For exam-
ple, some states simply ban private adoptions altogether. 19 Even
where private adoptions are allowed, there may be laws prohibit-
ing a consent to an adoption or the termination of rights to a
child prior to the birth of the child.20 Others may limit private
adoptions to situations where the natural parent or parents do
the placing directly. By far the most serious obstacle relates to
the payment terms of the agreement because most states outlaw
the payment or receipt by any party to an adoption agreement
in exchange for the placement of a child for adoption. 21 Further-
more, most states with artificial insemination laws prevent a
sperm donor from asserting rights to the child of a woman other
than his wife, thus making recognition of the husband as the
legal father more uncertain.
In addition, the paternity laws of most states presume that
18. Smith v. Jones, No. 85-532014 DZ (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich. Mar. 14, 1986).
19. See infra text accompanying note 24.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
21. See infra text accompanying note 31.
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the husband of the surrogate is the legal father, rather than the
man who contracts for the child and provides the sperm. If the
surrogate mother decides to keep the child, the biological father
may be prevented from ever bringing a paternity action because
he has no standing. Some states allow only the mother, child,
"presumed father" or the state to institute such suits.22 The re-
mainder of this article will discuss each of these issues in depth
and analyze the currently applicable state laws.
C. The Adoption Laws and Surrogate Mother Contracts
Certain surrogate mother arrangements fall within the pa-
rameters of the adoption codes of some states. The restrictions
in some jurisdictions make the typical surrogate arrangement il-
legal. For example, a lawyer planning a surrogate arrangement
must determine first, whether independent or non-agency adop-
tions are allowed in the state; second, what kind of payments
may be transferred in connection with those adoptions; and fi-
nally, whether or not a consent to an adoption may be given
prior to the child's birth.
If the state allows private placements and an intermediary
(the facilitator) can do the placing then at least this obstacle is
removed. At least nineteen states and the District of Columbia
are in this category.23 However, most states require that anyone,
other than the natural parents, who places a child for adoption
must be licensed as an adoption agency in the state.2 4 However,
22. See infra text accompanying notes 105-6.
23. Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Vir-
ginia and the District of Columbia, have no laws prohibiting private placements. In
Utah, private placements are allowed so long as no fees are charged. UTAH CODE ANN. §
55-8a-1(3) (1986). In Washington, private placements are allowed if filed with state
agency before the child is placed with adoptive parents. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
9A.64.030 (1986-87).
24. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (Supp. 1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224q (West 1987);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-108 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-49a (West Supp. 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-8-3(a)(4) (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-17 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
3-1-3 (Burns 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.473(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-507(a) (1984); MASS. ch. 210 § 2A (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.124 (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West 1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-4-402 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-701 (1978); NEv. REV. STAT. 127.240.1 (1985);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170B:8 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39 (West 1986-87); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-7-19 (1978); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(2) (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT.
19871 419
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the majority of these exempt adoptions by a step-parent from
this licensing requirement while other states allow the private
placement only if the parents place the child directly with the
adopting couple.25 Where private placements are absolutely pro-
hibited, surrogate contracts would be illegal and consequently
unenforceable. The facilitator may also face criminal penalties if
convicted of violating such provisions.26
In the states which require the natural parent to place the
child directly, the surrogate arrangement would have to be
structured such that the surrogate mother and adopting couple
would actually meet. If this should be contrary to the parties
wishes it may be possible to circumvent this problem by the
facilitator designating an "agent" for the surrogate mother, who
then places the child in accordance with the statute.2 7 The diffi-
CODE § 50-12-17 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5103.16 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.300
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-1(a) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-8 (1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 63,1-231 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.60 (West Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. § 1-22-109 (Supp. 1986).
25. Statutes allowing private placement with a step-parent include: ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-106 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-49a (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 904(2) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.212 (West Supp. 1985); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-3-1-3 (Burns 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.473(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1986); MASS. ch. 210 § 2A(C) (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.124 (Supp. 1982-83);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22(2)(b) (West 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170B:12 (1978); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39 (West 1986-87); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-19B (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
48-48-4(b) (1976); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5103.16 (Baldwin 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §
418.300 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-1(a) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-
8 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-196 (Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.60(2)(a) (West
Supp. 1986-87).
Some states permit parents to privately place the child directly with the adopting
couple. ALA. CODE § 26-10-7 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.3 (West Supp. 1983); MD.
FAM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 5-507(b)(2) (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 408-109 (1981); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-701 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. 127.240 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39 (West
1986-87); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-19 (1978); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(2) (McKinney
1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-17 (1982)-parent may place child with relative only
after written notice to state; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-1(a) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 26-6-8 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-114 (Supp. 1986). If adopting parents who
receive a child from natural parents determine they no longer want the child, they relin-
quish the child to a licensed agency without notice to the natural parents; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63. 1-204 (Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.835 (West Supp. 1982-83).
26. See e.g., Idaho Code § 18-1511 (1986).
27. One contract used by Kentucky's Surrogate Parenting Associates specifically stip-
ulates that both the surrogate and her husband, as well as the natural father and his
wife, must agree that they will "not seek to learn the identity" of the other parties or
"contact the same if their identity is learned." See Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.
v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986).
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culty here is drawing the line between a so-called "agent" and
an unlicensed intermediary who essentially serve the same func-
tions. The restriction on placements by third party in-
termediaries is ostensibly devised to protect against undesirable
placements, pressures exerted by intermediaries on parents and
potential profit making.2 8
Assuming that the state has no prohibition on private place-
ments, a greater problem looms in determining what fees may be
charged in connection with the surrogate adoption. Licensed
adoption agencies generally may assess certain fees for their ser-
vices provided in arranging a normal adoption, but it is not clear
whether an unlicensed intermediary may be granted the same
privilege. Of course it is possible for a facilitator to avoid the
problem by charging merely for legal or medical expenses, but
few women are likely to volunteer to be surrogate mothers with-
out compensation. In fact most women interviewed by one psy-
chiatrist cited the money as the prime motivator in their deci-
sion to become surrogate mothers.2 9 Only a few statutes deal
specifically with the issue of payments to intermediaries and
these generally provide for reasonable fees for services paid.30
Although the typical contract provides for the surrogate
mother to receive a fee averaging about $10,000, it is arguable
that the fee constitutes a service payment in exchange for the
surrogate's promise to relinquish the child at birth; or payment
for surrogate's donation of an egg and reasonable compensation
for her services in carrying the child for nine months. The pay-
ment could also be viewed as consideration for the sale of a
child.
The majority of states have statutory provisions which pro-
hibit the payment or receipt of anything of value in connection
28. MEEZAN, KATZ & Russo, ADOPTION WITHOUT AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT
ADOPTIONS 167 (1978) [hereinafter MEEZAN, KATZ & Russo].
29. Parker, supra note 15.
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097 (West 1985) (intermediary physician's or lawyer's fees
exceeding $500 must be reported to the court); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1704 (Smith-
Hurd 1986) (intermediaries' salaries and medical fees are permissible payments); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West 1981) (fees for legal or medical services allowed); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 127.285 (1981) (legal fees may be assessed only, no placement by an attorney is
allowed; attorney may charge only legal fees and no placement fees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23 § 2533(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987)(all money paid or received must be reported to the
court); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-1(2) (1986) (attorneys or physicians may charge for legal
or medical services not for locating or placing the child).
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with placing a child for adoption or which require reporting all
payments to the court ruling on the petition." On their face
these statutes are aimed at preventing the growth of a highly
profitable "black-market" for babies resulting from the current
shortage of readily adoptable babies.32 They also seek to prevent
abuses stemming from the increased use of independent adop-
tions where private intermediaries, as well as parents, might
seek to profit from an adoption transaction. These policies are
reinforced by the overall goal of protecting the best interests of
the child. 4
In the states which have adopted such regulations, any
facilitator must advise the participants that the typical paid sur-
rogate arrangement is probably illegal and the contracts voida-
ble.3 However, the transactions continue because the facilitators
characterize the surrogate's fee as a payment in exchange for the
''consent" to give up the child and the surrogate's services and,
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1970). See also ALA CODE § 26-10-8 (1986);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(B), 8-126(4)(C)-(F) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-211
(Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115
(1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 928 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(d) (West 1985);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40 §§
1526, 1701, 1702 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (West Supp. 1984-85); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 600.9 (West 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986);
MD. FAM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 5-327 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 11A (West
1986); !Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25-358 (Callaghan 1986); NEv. REV. STAT. 127.290 (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West 1986-87); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(b) (McKinney Supp.
1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3107.10(A) (Baldwin
1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.716 (West Supp. 1982).
However, since the statutes in the states of Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
and New Jersey exempt stepparents from the statutory reporting requirements for pay-
ment in connection with an adoption, it may be possible to circumvent the ban in these
states so long as the man who provided the sperm can prove that he is the biological
'father and thus that his adopting wife will be a stepparent.
32. See Moster & Pratt, supra note 5, at 3.
33. Crane, New Strategies in the Adoption Game, Los Angeles Herald Examiner,
Feb. 26, 1984, at El, col. 1. See also Comment, Surrogate Motherhood in California:
Legislative Proposals, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341, 372 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Sur-
rogate Motherhood].
34. Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption Placement,
9 FAm. L.Q. 547 (1975).
35. One lawyer, William Handel, who specializes in surrogate mother arrangements,
routinely advises his clients that because of the uncertainty in application of the laws to
surrogate arrangements, all parties could be subject to criminal and civil violations.
Crane, Raising a Family Raises New Questions, Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Feb. 28,
1984, at D1, col. 1.
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therefore, outside the scope of the adoption codes. Other propo-
nents argue that a surrogate arrangement is no different than a
typical artificial insemination where the male donor is paid for
his sperm.36 This argument, however, fails to note the essential
distinction between a sperm or ova and a fully developed child,
which is what the surrogate actually relinquishes.3 7
A more accurate analysis recognizes that the surrogate
mother is paid for her services of gestating the child and as in-
surance against incurred health risks. No health risks are in-
curred by the sperm donor, whereas a surrogate mother's entire
physiology is altered as a result of the pregnancy and she as-
sumes the attendant risks. It is only fair that she receive some
commensurate compensation. In addition, the Washington legis-
lature has recognized that "child-selling" cannot be accom-
plished between parents. 8 Viewing the surrogate's fee as pay-
ment for the sale of her child ignores the equal interest the
sperm donor has in the child. The surrogate mother is not sell-
ing her child, but merely transferring custody to the natural fa-
ther. Assuming a surrogate receives compensation for these ser-
vices and risks, a ceiling on the fee could be calculated on the
basis of these criteria alone and, consequently, the potential
profit-making abuses might be avoided. 9
The first judicial interpretation of the applicability of adop-
tion statutes payment prohibitions to surrogate mother transac-
tions arose in the case of Doe v. Kelly. 0 In the Kelly case, the
parties to a surrogate mother contract sought a preconception
court declaration that the "anti-black market" provisions in
Michigan's adoption code constituted an unconstitutional in-
fringement of the right of the sperm donor father and his wife to
bear a child. The lower court determined:
[the] primary purpose of the proposed [payment] is to
encourage women to volunteer to be surrogate
mothers. . . . In all but the rarest situtions, the money
which the plaintiffs seek to pay the surrogate mother is
36. Black, supra note 1, at 384.
37. Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 935, 981.
38. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.64.030 (1986-87).
39. Comment, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 33, at 378.
40. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W. 2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
1987] 423
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
intended as an inducement for her to conceive a child she
would not normally want to conceive . . .and to relin-
quish her parental rights to a child that she bore."1
The court was clearly concerned about the potential develop-
ment of a market of surrogate mothers wherein a bright, beauti-
ful, and talented woman could sell her services at a higher rate
than one who may be dull-witted or unattractive.
The court saw these dangers as sufficiently great to justify
state regulation of surrogate mother arrangements through the
adoption codes in order to prevent such undesirable practices
from emerging. The circuit court judge stated that "mercenary
considerations used to create a parent-child relationship and its
impact upon the family unit strikes at the very foundation of
human society and is patently and necessarily injurious to the
community.' 2 Furthermore, the court felt "it may not be in the
child's best interests psychologically to be given up by a mother
who was paid to do so."' 3 The Michigan Court of Appeals af-
firmed the lower court decision that such an arrangement was
not part of a couple's fundamental constitutional right "to bear
or beget" a child and that the state statute could stand."
In contrast, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that
payments to a surrogate cannot be prohibited under the anti-
black market statute in Kentucky. In a 5-2 decision, with vigor-
ous dissents, the court overruled two lower court decisions inter-
preting the Kentucky adoption statute as banning payments to a
surrogate mother, thus determining that the services of Surro-
gate Parenting Associates, Inc. were not illegal. 5
A New York court has recently issued a similar ruling al-
lowing a surrogate mother to be paid despite an adoption provi-
sion prohibiting such payments.' The court shared the views of
the Kentucky Supreme Court in the Surrogate Parenting case
and held that:
41. 6 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 3011, 3013 (Cir. Ct., Wayne Co., Mich., Jan. 28, 1980).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 106 Mich. App. at 173-74, 307 N.W. 2d at 441.
45. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W. 2d 209, 214 (Ky.
1986).
46. In re the Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (Sur.
Ct., Nassau Co. 1986).
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biomedical science has advanced man into a new era of
genetics which was not contemplated by either the Ken-
tucky legislature nor by the New York legislature when it
enacted SSL374(6) prohibiting payments in connection
with an adoption. Current legislation does not expressly
foreclose the use of surrogate mothers or the paying of
compensation to them under parenting agreements.47
Both courts emphasized that the social, ethical, and public
policy implications of the practice should be resolved by the
legislature.48
In New Jersey, the trial judge in In re Baby M held that the
state's "adoption laws do not apply to surrogacy contracts" on
the rationale that the practice did not exist when such laws were
passed. 49 The court deemed "contract law principles and parens
patriae concepts" to be the only appropriate analytical guide-
lines in these cases.50
In states which opt to follow the Michigan court's interpre-
tation in Doe v. Kelley, the parties to the typical surrogate con-
tract should be advised that their contract may be voidable be-
cause of the payment provision. However, other forms of
consideration such as a bargained for promise for performance
may be adequate to support the validity of the contract.51 Also,
in ten states which require that all payments made in connec-
tion with the adoption be reported in the petition for court ap-
proval, 52 one might argue before the hearing judge that a fee
paid to the surrogate for her services is indistinguishable from
the fee paid to a lawyer for his preparation of the legal docu-
ments or the compensation paid to a physician for performing
an artificial insemination. This view may prevail only if the
sperm donor father, his adopting wife, and the surrogate mother
are in agreement, and a challenge is brought by the state. How-
47. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S. 2d at 817-18.
48. Id. See also 704 S.W. 2d at 213.
49. 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
50. Id., 525 A.2d at 1158.
51. Comment, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 33, at 376.
52. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-211 (Supp. 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 912, 928 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097 (West 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-8-121 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3107.10 (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 866 (West 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23
§ 2533(b)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-223(d) (7) (Supp. 1986).
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ever, if a Baby "M" scenario develops, a judge will be forced to
analyze the case as one in which the best interest of the child
should be the only consideration.
Many of the states which regulate payments in connection
with adoption generally exempt natural or stepparents from the
prohibitions."' Presumably, the reason for such an exemption
lies in the fact that no money would normally change hands
when a child is adopted by a stepparent, who in this case would
be the natural father's wife, and the father already has custody
of the child. Washington, for example, has a statute which pro-
hibits child-selling, but in its definition of what constitutes a
sale, the legislature chose to exclude any transactions between
parents.5 4 If the surrogate arrangement were viewed as a step-
parent adoption, the exemption would seem to permit a pay-
ment to the surrogate.
However, receipt of a fee by the surrogate may in fact viti-
ate her consent to the adoption.5 This is a particular problem to
the couple in the event the surrogate decides to renege on the
contract and keep the child. The couple would have to prove
first that the surrogate's decision was not a result of overbearing
financial enticements. The law in this area favors the mother in
normal adoption cases. 6
Certain statutory provisions imply that the respective legis-
latures were concerned with what they viewed as the potential
harm stemming from certain influences on a mother consenting
to her child's adoption. This is illustrated by the Alabama provi-
sion preventing anyone from "holding out inducements to par-
53. Statutes exempting stepparent adoptions from expense reporting requirements
include: ALASKA STAT. § 25. 23.090(b) (1983); ALA. CODE § 26-10-7 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-114(A),(B)(Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-211(b) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 224 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.132 (West 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1517
(1986) and § 1703 (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-55 (West 1986-87); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
116 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(2) (1981); OHIO REV. CODE §
3107.10(E) (Baldwin 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 2531(c) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.030 (Supp. 1986-87).
55. Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or. App. 450, 513 P. 2d 1216 (1973), discussed in Comment,
Artificial Insemination & Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Unresolved Ques-
tions, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 913, 947 (1981).
56. See DeBernardi v. Steve B.D. & Linda Sue D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P. 2d 829
(1986), in which the court held that a natural mother could revoke her consent to an
adoption unless estopped by facts which run counter to the best interests of the child.
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ents to part with their offspring. '57 Oklahoma and South Caro-
lina require that the petition contain any "facts which may
excuse" the mother's consent. 8 Certainly a surrogate's fee, par-
ticularly if paid to a woman facing financial hardship, might pro-
vide such an "excuse" to her consent.
Not all states have placed the same restrictions on the
payee of a fee in connection with an adoption as those imposed
on the payors. For example, Alabama forbids the couple from
inducing the mother to part with her child by paying the money,
but says nothing about the surrogate accepting the fee. 9 Massa-
chusetts prohibits accepting payment in connection with adop-
tion except in the case of payment to a licensed agency. 0 Idaho
makes anyone who sells or barters any child for adoption or any
other purpose subject to a felony charge.6
It may be possible, however, to structure an agreement us-
ing the laws, which exist in almost every state, permitting a par-
ent to voluntarily terminate his or her parental rights either
before or after the child's birth.2' These statutes are not always
57. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1986).
58. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.12(g) (West 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1730(A)(7)
(Supp. 1986).
59. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1986).
60. MASS. CODE ch. 210 § 11A.
61. IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1986); See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(d) (West
1985).
62. ALA. CODE § 26-10-4 (1986); ALASKA STAT, § 25.23.180 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-533 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017
(West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-101 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-61(c) (1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(1) (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2353 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
63.072 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-4 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005 et seq. (1986)
;IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.5 (West 1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1584 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:402 (West. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 533-
A (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.29 (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.221(a) (1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-101 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.2
(Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-402 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. 128.150
(1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-16 (West 1986-
87); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-3 (1978); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 615 (McKinney 1976); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-288 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-19 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1130 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 2511 (Pur-
don Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1560 (Supp.
1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5A-2 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-110 (1984);
TEX. FAM. CODE § 15.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48 (Supp. 1985);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 432 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Supp. 1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.100 (Supp. 1986-87); W. VA. CODE § 49-3-1 (1986); Wis. STAT.
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limited to terminations made in connection with an adoption.
Some facilitators have viewed these provisions as a means to cir-
cumvent the adoption laws which prohibit payments outside of
normal expenses and services.
In Kentucky, this method was attempted by Surrogate
Parenting Associates, but it came under fire from the Kentucky
Attorney General who claimed such an arrangement violated
public policy. 3 Although at the time no statutory equivalent to
the payment prohibition in adoptions existed in the termination
statute, the Attorney General stated: "It is our opinion that the
courts of this Commonwealth will not allow persons to receive
monetary consideration for the procurement of a child, regard-
less of whether it is referred to as an adoption proceeding or as a
termination of parental rights."'64 The Kentucky legislature sub-
sequently amended the statute to include a ban on payments in
connection with terminating parental rights." When the Ken-
tucky Attorney General subsequently sought to enjoin the busi-
ness practices of Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., the court
disregarded the prior opinion of the Attorney General and held
that the surrogate contracts were not illegal because a natural
father "does not (and cannot) buy the right to adopt a child
with which he already has a legal and natural relationship.""
The Court of Appeals, in its reversal, viewed the legislature as
speaking directly to surrogate motherhood contracts and, there-
fore, any payment to the surrogate was not for the "sale" of a
child. 7 However, using a novel theory, the Kentucky Supreme
Court deemed the legislature to have approved a "tampering
with nature in the interest of assisting a childless couple to con-
ceive" by its exclusion of in vitro fertilization from the statutory
ANN. § 48.41 (West Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-309 (Supp. 1986).
The court in Baby M, however, held that such laws are inapplicable to surrogate
contracts. 525 A.2d at 1157.
63. Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18 at 2 (1981).
64. Id. at 4. The counter argument has been made that this payment prohibition
applies only to the "procurement of a child for adoption," and that a surrogate contract
is not one for adoption at all, but rather a contract for custody. Note, In Defense of
Surrogate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky Experience, 69 Ky.
L.J. 877, 897-98 (1981).
65. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986).
66. Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. Inc., 10 Fain. L. Rep. 1105, 1106; 704





A facilitator attempting to use this form of termination pro-
vision must avoid running afoul of any provisions similar to an-
other Kentucky law requiring that after such a termination or
relinquishment of parental rights, a licensed child-placing.
agency must take custody of the child or the child may be
placed by any other person only after making "written applica-
tion to the Secretary (Cabinet for Human Resources) for permis-
sion to place or receive the child."6 So although a termination
statute may have no direct prohibition on payments, the execu-
tion of the contract could be hampered by the requirement that
a licensed agency place the child.
The case of In re Baby Girl,70 illustrates this point. The
judge ruled that a surrogate mother may not terminate her pa-
, rental rights to a child which she bore for pay and then transfer
custody to the adopting couple without permission of the Cabi-
net for Human Resources.7 1 The above proviso is not, however,
applicable to a stepparent adoption in Kentucky. There, if the
father can obtain custody, the surrogate may be paid. 2
An additional adoption law problem involves the timing of
the requisite consent of the surrogate mother to her child's
adoption by the donor's wife.7 ' The typical contract requires the
surrogate mother to consent to an adoption or to terminate her
parental rights prior to the birth of the child. Most states' adop-
tion laws have a provision which invalidates any consent to an
adoption granted prior to a child's birth. These provisions are
based on the theory that a mother may not have adequately re-
flected upon the decision or that it may be viewed in a different
light following the child's birth. Several states have therefore
adopted a requirement that the mother wait three days follow-
68. 704 S.W. 2d at 212.
69. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.473(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986). This provision
then allows the state office to investigate the situation for suitability, thus insuring
against the potential abuses discussed supra at text accompanying note 20. See also
MEEZAN, KATZ & Russo, supra note 28, at 167.
70. 9 Fain. L. Rep. 2348 (BNA) (Cir. Ct. Jefferson Co. Ky. 1983).
71. Id.
72. This may became a moot point following the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision
in Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 209.
73. This waiting period must be distinguished from the waiting periods courts require




ing a child's birth before consenting to its adoption.74 Several
other states will validate the consent as long as it is given any
time after the child's birth.75 Massachusetts has a four day wait-
ing period 7  and Kentucky, Louisiana, and South Dakota have
instituted a five day rule." Virginia requires a mother to wait
ten days before consenting to an adoption of her child7 and
Rhode Island's wait is the longest, requiring a full fifteen days to
pass after the birth before a consent may be signed.7
If applied to a surrogate mother arrangement, these restric-
tions on a mother's right to consent to an adoption would invali-
date the pre-contractual intent of the parties. This raises two
problems for the parties involved in the contract: (1) without
consideration and an enforceable contract, the surrogate could
legally renege on her obligations and keep the child; or (2) even
if the surrogate goes through with the agreement, she could be
found guilty of child selling in certain states.80
Laws governing the timing of an adoption consent are, how-
ever, aimed at insuring that the mother's consent is given with-
out any duress or coercion by third parties. A surrogate mother
is easily distinguished from a woman who decides to give up her
child for adoption in that the latter's pregnancy is usually un-
planned and the ability or desire of the mother to raise the child
is a major consideration in a decision to consent to her child's
adoption. The surrogate mother, on the other hand, makes her
decision prior to conception with full knowledge of her circum-
stances and obligations, and, thus, such pressures become irrele-
74. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107(B) (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1511
(Smith-Hurd 1986); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.27(5) (Supp. 1982-83); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-5 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:7 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3107 (Baldwin 1986).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.060(a) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(1) and (4) (West
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-4(a) (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6(b) (1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 127.020.1 (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-8 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-07
(1981).
76. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 2 (West 1986).
77. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:422.7 (West Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5A-4 (1984).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (Supp. 1986).
79. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-6 (1981).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. Other forms of consideration such as
the bargained-for promise of performance may be sufficient for the contract's enforce-
ability. See Comment, Surrogate Motherhod, supra note 33, at 376 (1981).
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vant. In contrast, the mother giving up a child for adoption may
feel that even three to ten days is not a sufficient length of time
to guarantee that her decision was made without duress." It is
the emotional experience of the pregnancy and birth which usu-
ally overcomes a natural mother who subsequently chooses not
to give up her child for adoption and a surrogate who chooses to
renege on her contract.2
D. Artificial Insemination Laws and the Presumptions of
Paternity
Since the surrogate mother is impregnated by artificial in-
semination, laws governing this procedure can also affect the pa-
rental rights of the parties to a surrogate contract. The process
of artificial insemination has been widely used for decades as a
solution to male infertility. The process involves using the sperm
of an anonymous donor to impregnate a woman whose husband
is infertile or an unmarried woman who desires to raise a geneti-
cally-related child. Some early cases imposed the stigma of adul-
tery on the woman who had been artificially inseminated with
the sperm of an anonymous donor and declared the resulting
offspring as illegitimate. 3 At least between 6,000 and 10,000
children are born annually through artificial insemination by a
donor,8' and thirty states now regulate the procedure in varying
degrees.8 5 All of the artificial insemination statutes legitimize the
child resulting from the artificial insemination as the legally rec-
ognized offspring of the woman who was artificially inseminated
81. MEEZAN, KATZ & Russo, supra note 28, at 155. The authors also note that in
Great Britain consent to the adoption of a child is not allowed until 6 weeks after the
birth of a child.
82. Mary Beth Whitehead did not anticipate the attachment she may have developed
to "Baby M" and desired the experience of caring for an infant again. Span, The Fierce
War of Longing Over Baby M., Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1986, at El, col. , E4, col..
83. See Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (1984), dismissed on procedural
grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E. 2d 844 (1986); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083,
242 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
84. Curie-Cohen, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United
States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 588 (1979) [hereinafter Curie-Cohen].
85. With increased public awareness of genetically and sexually transmitted diseases,
a growing number of proponents are urging expanded regulation of the procedure. See
Comment, The Need for Regulation of Artificial Insemination by Donor, 22 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1193 (1985). See also Council of District of Columbia Sperm Bank Licensure and
Regulatory Act of 1985 (Proposed Bill 6-131).
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and her husband-" As beneficial as such provisions are for the
child, these statutes have the effect of totally foreclosing the de-
sired outcome of the surrogate contract, i.e., that the sperm do-
nor be recognized as the father with parental rights in the
offspring.
Unfortunately, for would-be parents under a surrogate ar-
rangement in sixteen states, the laws specifically sever all the
donor's rights to the child; 7 in three of these, however, the man
providing the sperm is allowed to contract to be the legal fa-
ther."8 These statutes also confer legitimate status on the child
where the consent of both natural mother and her husband is
given. In addition, many of the statutes require that the insemi-
nation be performed only by a licensed physician or someone
under his order or supervision.8 9 The only plausible reason for
86. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
34-720 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69i (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 1986); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-21 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 39-5401 et seq. (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 §
1453(3)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 188 (West Supp. 1987); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974) and MD.
GEN. PROV. CODE § 20-214 (1982); MIH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824 (1980) and §
700.111 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (1982); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-6-1-6
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.061 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1986-87); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 49A-1 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 31 § 3.111.37 (Page Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 551-553 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 677.355, 677.365,
677.370 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (Supp. 1983); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03
(Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050
(West 1986); W[S. STAT. ANN. § 767.47(9) (West 1986-87) and § 891.40 (West 1986-87);
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986).
87. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(b) (1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1987); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-6-106(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69(j) (WEST 1985); IDAHO CODE §
39-5405 (1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 § 1453(3)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257.56(2) (1982); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.061(2) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 1986-87); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-
6(B) (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 31 § 3.117.37(B) (Page Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109. 239(1)(2) (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE § 12.03(B) (Vernon 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26-26050(a) (West 1986); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West Supp. 1986-87); WYo. STAT.
§ 14-2-103(b) (1986).
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 1986-87) (unless woman and donor have en-
tered into a written contract to the contrary);N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(B) (1986) (unless
the woman and donor have agreed in writing to the contrary); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26-26.050(2)(West 1986)(unless the woman and donor have agreed in writing to the
contrary).
89. ALASKA STAT. 25.20.045 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-722 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7005(a) (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106(1) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
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such a requirement is that it provides a reliable third party to
document the act and to verify the consent of the parties, and in
some cases to perform the appropriate genetic screening.90 How-
ever, there appears to be no medically significant justification
for the stipulation, since any woman is capable of performing
the relatively simple procedure herself. In fact, the first publi-
cized surrogate mother did just that by using a paper cup and
drug store syringe."
In the states in which the paternity presumptions are in-
volved, a sperm donor father faces a host of obstacles to sur-
mount. In one such instance, a Michigan court rejected one
couple's attempt to bypass the statutory presumptions of pater-
nity under the artificial insemination statutes by having the hus-
band of the surrogate withhold his consent and expressly state
such "non-consent" in an affidavit.2 The plaintiff in the case,
George Syrkowski, sought a declaration under the Michigan Pa-
ternity Act that a child conceived by him through the artificial
insemination of defendant, Corinne Appleyard, should be legally
recognized as his own. He sought an order of filiation pursuant
to the paternity statute and the entry of his name on the birth
certificate as the child's natural father. The defendant admitted
all the allegations and submitted a sworn statement by the phy-
sician that the defendant was inseminated with the sperm of Mr.
ANN. § 45-69(g) (West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56
(1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1) (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1981); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 73(2) (McKinney 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 31 § 3111.32 (Page
Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551, 553 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.370
(1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(1)
(West 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West 1986-87); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103(a) (1977).
The laws in California, Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, and Virginia state a physician's
supervision is necessary in order to legitimate the child. Washington, however, specifi-
cally stipulates that a failure of a physician to file his certification with the state willnot
affect the father-child relationship.
90. Unless specifically requested by the parties involved, very little genetic screening
is performed, and data regarding family histories are only superficial. Record-keeping on
artificial inseminations has generally been very haphazard. See Curie-Cohen, supra note
82.
91. Griffin, Womb for Rent, 9 STUD. LAW. 28 (Apr. 1981). In at least one state, how-
ever, this would be grounds for a criminal charge of practicing medicine without a li-
cense, although enforcement of such a statute would seem virtually impossible. A penalty
of up to 30 days imprisonment or a fine of $250 is possible under OR. REV. STAT. §
677.990 (1981).
92. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W. 2d 90 (1983), rev'd 420
Mich. 367, 362 N.W. 2d 211 (1985).
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Syrkowski. The Appleyards offered an affidavit in support of
Syrkowski's motion that they "voluntarily abstained" from sex-
ual intercourse during the period in issue."' However, the Michi-
gan Attorney General intervened, claiming the action sought was
beyond the scope of the Paternity Act and alleged that, pursu-
ant to the Michigan artificial insemination statute, Mr. Ap-
pleyard must be deemed the father of the child."'
In reply, Mr. Syrkowski offered Mr. Appleyard's "Statement
of Non-Consent" which was made in an attempt to circumvent
the statute's declaration that with a husband's consent to an ar-
tificial insemination, the child is considered the legitimate off-
spring of that marriage. The attorney general pointed out the
incongruity between Appleyard's "statement of Non-Consent"
and affidavit that he and his wife "voluntarily" abstained from
sexual intercourse for purposes of the insemination. The lower
courts refused to accept this statement as evidence to rebut the
paternity presumption and held the request was beyond the
scope of the Paternity Act, which was intended only to establish
child support obligations.9 However, the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed the lower court decision and held that the court
did have subject matter jurisdiction to determine the status of
the child and the father's biological paternity under the Pater-
nity Act since both are necessary prerequisites to the enforce-
ment of a support obligation under the Act. 6
In a context outside the realm of surrogate parenting, how-
ever, other courts have supported denials of other petitions for
paternity declaration on a narrow jurisdictional reading. For ex-
ample, in a New York case, a man claiming to be the natural
father of a child already being supported and cared for by the
mother's former husband sought a declaration of his rights as
father of the child. The court held that no basis for jurisdiction
existed under the paternity statute's proceedings.9 7 The court
further held that the paternity statute was intended only for de-
termination of support obligations and not paternity status.9
93. 122 Mich. App. at 507, 333 N.W. 2d at 91.
94. Id. at 508, 333 N.W. 2d at 92.
95. 420 Mich. at 369, 362 N.W. 2d at 213.
96. Id. at 370, 362 N.W. 2d at 214.
97. Czajak v. Varonese, 104 Misc. 2d 601, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 986 (1980).
98. Id. at 609, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
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The court would only allow the proceeding if the putative father
established a prima facie case that the child was in need of sup-
port.9  Decisions of this latter type clearly do not favor a sperm
donor or any putative father who seeks to have his parental
rights in his offspring legally recognized.
In Washington, New Jersey, and New Mexico, however, a
sperm donor may counter the paternity presumption by claim-
ing his paternity rights in writing.100 This is a dramatic depar-
ture from the approach taken by those states which have
adopted artificial insemination statutes which sever the donor's
rights explicitly, or which do so implicitly by presuming the wo-
man's husband to be the natural or legitimate father if he has
consented to the procedure.'0 '
The artificial insemination statutes also raise questions
about the applicability of artificial insemination to an unmarried
surrogate mother. Of the nine states which enacted a version of
the Uniform Parentage Act ["UPA"], a few have implied that
the law could apply to single women. Subsection 2 of § 5 of the
UPA provides that "[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman
other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father of the child thereby conceived."'0 2 In California,
Colorado, and Wyoming, the reference to a "married" woman
has been omitted, 103 thus opening the door to permit the insemi-
nation of a single woman without a presumptive father, protect-
ing the donor from a potential paternity action to care for and
support the child. This implication becomes especially impor-
tant in the surrogate agreement where it may be desirous to use
an unmarried surrogate in order to avoid the problems of rebut-
ting the husband's presumed paternity.0 This produces a result
opposite that desired by the sperm donors in a surrogate situa-
tion who want their paternity rights to be legally recognized.
Arkansas is the only state which has passed a law which
99. Id. at 609, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
100. See supra note 79.
101. Id.
102. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 5(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1981).
103. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(6) (West 1987); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (1978); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-2-103 (1978).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 107-30.
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specifically contemplates the use of a surrogate mother. The Ar-
kansas statute presumes a child born to a single mother impreg-
nated by artificial insemination to be "the child of the woman
giving birth, except in the case of a surrogate mother in which
event the child shall be that of the woman intended to be the
mother.""'6
In states not utilizing a UPA format, the laws legitimizing
the child speak in terms of "husband" and "wife" and require
consents of both parties. In a few of these states, consent is pre-
sumed by the mere existence of a husband and need not be in
writing. For example, according to the Maryland statute which
legitimates a child conceived through the artificial insemination
of a "married woman with the consent of her husband . . . con-
sent of the husband is presumed." 10 6 Even if a surrogate's hus-
band wanted to file a "statement of non-consent" to avoid the
paternity presumption, it may be held invalid under a strict
statutory reading. 10 7
All this leaves the sperm donor father who wants to claim
his legal rights as father of the child conceived through artificial
insemination pinned against the wall of legal presumptions
which favor the paternity of the surrogate's husband and pre-
vent the donor from acknowledging and claiming his paternity.
Some states do allow a putative father to acknowledge his pater-
nity in writing, prior to the birth of a child born out of wedlock,
when no other presumed father exists.108 If the mother doesn't
dispute it, the natural father should be allowed to assert his
rights.
If the surrogate mother is married, the paternity presump-
tion problem further erodes the contracting parties' intentions
because of the near impossibility of rebutting the presumption
in favor of her husband. In UPA states, a man may be consid-
105. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-721(B) (Supp. 1985). The statute presumes, however, the
birth mother to be the natural mother for birth registration purposes, and a court order
must issue to show the surrogate as the mother on a birth certificate.
106. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE § 1-206 (1974).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
108. ALA. CODE § 26-11-2 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.050 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
61-141(d) (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-1510 (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 2
(West 1986); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.33(2) (West Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.070(5) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 8302 (Purdon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-30-4(3)(b) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE 1 20-61.1 (Supp. 1983).
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ered a presumed father if he brings the child into his home and
holds out the child as his natural offspring.109 When two pre-
sumed fathers exist, then the law states that "the presumption
which on the facts is founded on weightier considerations of pol-
icy and logic controls."" 0 In the surrogate case where the parties
adhere to their contract, these provisions present no problem. As
long as the surrogate mother freely gives the child to the natural
father, he can establish the presumption under §4(a)(2) of the
UPA. It is reasonable to assume that with the contract as evi-
dence and affidavits regarding the artificial insemination by the
physician that policy and logic would favor a paternity declara-
tion in favor of the natural father. This would consequently en-
able his wife to adopt the child under the less restrictive step-
parent adoption rules."'
However, in the scenario in which the surrogate mother ref-
uses to give up the child as stipulated in the contract, the natu-
ral father may not even bring an action under most paternity
statutes' rules of standing. The majority of states have a law
similar to California's UPA which only allows "a child, the
child's natural mother or a man presumed to be [the child's] fa-
ther" to bring an action for a declaration of paternity." ' This
same provision in Colorado's version of the UPA" 3 has been de-
clared unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court on
grounds that it violates the equal protection rights of natural
fathers not married to the mothers of their children. That case
involved a natural father, R. McG., seeking determination of his
status as natural father to the child, C.W., who was born to the
mother, J.W., as a result of an extramarital affair."' Serological
testing of the claiming father indicated a 98.89 percent
probability that he was in fact C.W.'s natural father."5 The pre-
sumed father, W.W., refused to be tested. The lower court
109. Uniform Parentage Act § 4(a)(2).
110. Uniform Parentage Act § 4(b).
111. See supra note 25.
112. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-716 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7006 (West
Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-43 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-2 (Burns 1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57 subdiv. 2 (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1981).
113. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-107 (1986).
114. R. McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980). See also In re M.P.R., 123
P. 2d 743 (Colo 1986).
115. 200 Colo. at 347, 615 P. 2d at 668.
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granted summary judgment for the defendants based on the
plaintiff's lack of standing under the UPA to bring the action.
Since R. McG. was not "presumed to be the child's father"
under the Colorado statute, he was not authorized to bring an
action claiming the existence of a father-child relationship. " 6
The natural father, R. McG., appealed, arguing that his
fourteenth amendment, equal protection rights were violated be-
cause the statute "impermissibly discriminated between natural
mothers and claiming natural fathers." This argument was up-
held by the Colorado Supreme Court. As the court stated, the
statutory scheme of the UPA "creates more than a difference in
treatment of natural mothers and fathers. It establishes contrary
treatment."17
The majority opinion utilized the intermediate standard of
judicial scrutiny applicable to gender-based classifications enun-
ciated in Caban v. Mohammed, which holds that such a statu-
tory "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.""' 8 While the
court recognized the state's interest in preserving the integrity of
families, and maintaining harmonious settings in the home, it
also noted that the statute permits a natural mother to bring a
paternity action which may be damaging to the stability of a
natural father's family relationships, even if he is married to
someone else and has other children. On the other hand, the
court further noted the natural father is prevented from estab-
lishing his own claim of paternity as well as from rebutting the
statutory presumption that the husband of the natural mother is
the father. Thus the court held that if the natural mother may
bring a paternity suit against a natural father under the statute,
the plaintiff as a claiming father should be given the same
right." 9
In a concurring opinion, Judge Dubofsky said that the state
could show a preference for the mother's family unit without vi-
116. Id. at 347-48, 615 P.2d at 668-69.
117. Id. at 350, 615 P.2d at 671.
118. Caban v. Mohommed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979)(quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
119. 200 Colo. 350, 615 P. 2d at 671.
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olating equal protection guarantees because the mother's iden-
tity is generally not questioned, while the father's paternity is
not so easy to establish. 120 Consequently, Judge Dubofsky pre-
ferred a due process justification for invalidating the statute
based on the case of Stanley v. Illinois.'2' In that case, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized a due process right of a natural fa-
ther which required that he be given an opportunity to be heard
in order to protect his fundamental right to conceive and bear
children.'22 In the Colorado case, R. McG. had "no alternate
remedy for protecting his interest as the child's natural father"
and this interest, coupled with his desire to support the child,
outweighed the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the
child's present family unit.'23
In a later case, however, brought in Wyoming, challenging
the same UPA provision, 2 " the state supreme court reached the
opposite result. Though the facts were remarkably similar and
the statutory language identical to that in the Colorado case, the
Wyoming court found no denial of equal protection or due pro-
cess, claiming that any classifications made by the statute "real-
istically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated
in the circumstances." '25 The court found that the natural fa-
ther's interest in claiming paternity did not involve a fundamen-
tal right, but even if it did, the classification could withstand
strict scrutiny although the court did not really apply the test.
The court further attempted to characterize the classification as
non-gender based and as a "distinction between those within the
family unit and those without, regardless of gender.' 12 The ap-
parent gist of the court's opinion is that the state's overriding
concern in protecting a solid family unit outweighs the interest
of a stranger to that relationship, in this case, the natural father.
The court feared that recognition of the standing of a claiming
natural father to establish his paternity would "invite similar ac-
120. Id. at 352, 615 P.2d at 673.
121. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
122. 200 Colo. 352, 615 P. 2d at 673; cf., In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525
A.2d at 1165-66.
123. Id. at 352-53, 615 P.2d at 673-74.
124. See WYo. STAT. § 14-2-104 (1977).
125. A. v. X., Y., & Z., 641 P. 2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021
(1982).
126. 641 P.2d at 1226.
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tions by those whose only purpose is to break up a family unit in
order to satisfy a jealous or revengeful feeling.' '1 27
This point is truly untenable because rare would be a situa-
tion in which anyone but a true biological father would seek out
the responsibilities of support and care which come with the ter-
ritory of a paternity suit. A far more reasoned approach was
taken by the chief justice of the Wyoming court in his dissent:
[T]he court could deny the putative father the right to
pursue his parental rights under his established relation-
ship for the reason that it would not be in the child's best
interests, but this result could only be reached after the
putative father is provided with a hearing on the matter.
Since [the statute] fails to provide for such a procedure it
is a denial of the biological father's rights of due
process.12
8
Yet another approach to this problem was assumed by an
Illinois appellate court in the case of Pritz v. Chesnul. 121 Al-
though that case involved a natural father claiming paternity of
an illegitimate child, the statutory provision on standing pro-
vided that only the mother of the child or the Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Aid could bring a declaratory action to establish
paternity and enforce liability for support and welfare of the
child.130 Instead of flatly declaring the statute unconstitutitonal,
the court held that the father of an illegitimate child has a "con-
stitutional right to a legal forum with due process procedures to
establish his natural parentage and his parental rights" and that
the statute should not be construed to bar the father's action.'
Essentially, the court ignored the very plain meaning of the lan-
guage of the statute and construed it to allow the father's pater-
127. Id. at 1225. A commentator on the Colorado case stated:
[It] should be not be assumed that many extra-marital fathers will use this new
avenue simply because it is now open to them. Only the most persistent and
concerned claiming fathers are likely to pursue an action which may destroy
their own family units and will, if successful, require substantial support
obligations.
Note, Bastardizing the Legitimate Child, 59 DEN. L.J. 157, 171 (1981).
128. 641 P. 2d at 1235.
129. 106 Ill. App. 3d 969, 436 N.E. 2d 631 (App. Ct. 1982).
130. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40 § 1354 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
131. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 972, 436 N.E. 2d at 634. See also In re Sullivan, 134 I1. App.




A related problem was presented in a California case in
which the issue involved the ability of a purported father and
natural child, through a guardian ad litem, to present blood test
evidence in order to prove his paternity by rebutting the conclu-
sive presumption of the Evidence Code §621. l 33 The situation in-
volved a child, Michelle, born as the result of an extramarital
affair between her mother and natural father. After the child's
birth, the mother and presumed father divorced and the mother
then married the plaintiff-the natural father. In that case, the
plaintiffs were not allowed to present blood test evidence and,
consequently, the presumption against the plaintiff according to
§621 became irrebuttable.3 4 Although the plaintiffs alleged a
due process violation, the California Supreme Court held that
the public interest in protecting a family unit outweighed the
plaintiff's interest. In addition, the court distinguished the case
from Caban in that the California statute did not exclude the
rights of a father altogether, but rather, required that the fa-
ther's rights be conditioned upon the mother's.3 5
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that only
the most compelling interests will justify statutory presumptions
which would preclude a natural father from establishing his pa-
ternity rights to a child he has sired. These interests are limited
to protection of the child's welfare and preserving an already in-
tact family unit. However, even these compelling interests are
constitutionally insufficient justifications for such statutory pre-
sumptions when a claiming father is denied all other recourse to
establishing his paternity.136
Some states have statutorily recognized the right of a natu-
ral father to assert his paternity rights and have provided a
132. 106 Ill. App.3d 973, 436 N.E. 2d at 635. The court said the words are "plain but
their reach and the limits of their application are not defined."Id.
133. Michelle W. v. Ronald. W., 139 Cal. App. 3d 24, 188 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1983), aff'd,
39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P. 2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985)(en banc), appeal dismissed sub
nom., Michelle Marie W. v. Riley, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986). CAL EvID. CODE § 621(a) (West
1987) states that "the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." The presumption may
be rebutted by blood tests which can only be offered by the husband or natural mother.
134. 139 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
135. 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P. 2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985).
136. See R. McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P. 2d 666 (1980).
1987]
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
mechanism for such an assertion. For example, Washington has
modified the UPA by adding that any interested party may
bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of
paternity regardless of the source of the paternity pre-
sumption."' 7
Indiana also permits the presumed father, the mother, or an
alleged father to bring a paternity action, even if the mother and
presumed father were married at the time of conception.138
In Minnesota, the biological parents may declare they are
parents of a child "born out of wedlock" which would be conslu-
sive evidence of paternity."3 9
Based on all the potentially applicable statutes currently
enacted, Washington is one state in which surrogate contracts
would escape the legal challenges previously discussed. Private
adoptions are allowed; the surrogate could be paid for her ser-
vices since such payment should not be considered an unlawful
"sale" of the child; no waiting period is required before which
'the surrogate may consent to the adoption; the artificial insemi-
nation statute provides for recognition of the donor's rights in
the child if so desired; and should the surrogate or her husband
breach their obligations in giving up the child, at least the natu-
ral father may bring an action to establish his paternity.
IV. LAWS APPLICABLE TO SURROGATE CARRIERS AND EMBRYO
TRANSFER
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has declared it legal
for a woman to conceive a child in vivo and give birth to that
child for a fee, in some states it is against the law to be paid for
transferring an embryo to another woman who may subse-
quently give birth to the child. In ten states which prohibit a
woman from selling a fetus for purposes of experimentation, the
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.060(2) (1986).
138. IND. CODE § 31-6-6.1-2 (Burns 1980).
139. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.34 (1982). The Baby M case illustrates that establishing
paternity is only a step in the process of the AI donor's goal to obtain custody of his
offspring. While asserting his paternity rights bolsters his custody case, the outcome of
such decisions vary from case to case and predicting an outcome is nearly impossible,
since so many non-legal factors will enter into a court's analysis of the child's best inter-
ests. Goodman, Baby M trial sends disturbing messages about America's class structure,
Chicago Tribune, Mar. 1, 1987, § 5, at 3, col.1.
[Vol. IV
CONCEIVING FOR CASH
statutory language may be broad enough to potentially ban pay-
ment to a woman who transfers her embryo.1" ' Florida has en-
acted a law specifically forbidding the sale and purchase of
embryos.141
The embryo transfer technique may also run afoul of cer-
tain statutes which prohibit embryo research done in connection
with an abortion which may also encompass the lavage tech-
nique used in embryo transfer."2 In addition, where donor in
vitro fertilization is employed and an unrelated surrogate carrier
is paid, the same legal issues are raised as in the typical surro-
gate mother situation. Despite the fact that the woman "who
gives birth to the child is genetically unrelated to the child," it is
conceivable that our existing perceptions of maternity stemming
from the woman who gives birth would favor a surrogate carrier
who was determined to keep the child. However, one court has
recognized that the woman who provides an egg to be fertilized
in vitro and implanted in the womb of a surrogate carrier, may
be the "legal" mother of the child, provided tissue samples from
mother and child can be matched following the birth. 43
Any facilitator who uses donor in vitro must be cognizant of
the laws applicable to the technology of in vitro fertilization.
While in vitro fertilization is a more commonly used technique
and may no longer be considered experimental, some fetal re-
search laws could impose special duties of care upon those in-
volved in transferring and implanting embryos. 4 '
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that new legislation must be adopted to
adequately protect the interests of the parties to surrogate
140. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593 (West 1980); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 §
12J(a) IV (West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1980): NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-342 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2914
(Baldwin 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735A (West 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-
1(f) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208(b) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-311 (1978)
WYO STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977). Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wyoming cover only
aborted fetuses.
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 1986).
142. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOYOLA L. REV. 357, 377 (1986).
143. Smith v. Jones, 85-532014 DZ (3d Jud. Dist., Mich. Mar. 14, 1986).
144. See generally Andrews, supra note 135, at 398-400.
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motherhood and surrogate carrier agreements. 45 Only Arkansas
and Louisiana have passed laws specifically dealing with surro-
gate contracts, but no states have enacted the comprehensive
legislation that is necessary to address the concerns of society-
at-large and the parties involved in all of the current reproduc-
tive technologies. 146 Consequently, courts have been forced to re-
solve the legal problems in this area. Although most courts thus
far have adopted positions favoring the legality of these new ar-
rangements, they have done so reluctantly. 4" Therefore, while
"conceiving for cash" may indeed be legal today in such jurisdic-
tions as Washington, because its statutes, on their face, do not
prohibit the surrogate mother arrangement, or in Kentucky and
New Jersey, because courts have voiced their approval of the
transactions, this conclusion is by no means certain in other ju-
risdictions. Until new legislation is adopted, the participants
must continue to assume the risks of the statutory uncertainties.
145. See HASTINGS REPORT; see, supra, note 3.
146. Id.; Freed, As Surrogate Parenting Increases, States Must Resolve Legal Issues,
Nat'l L. J., Dec. 22, 1986, at 28.
147. The New York court ruling in In re Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 Misc. 2d
972, 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 stated: "this court, in spite of its strong reservations
about these arrangements both on moral and ethical grounds, is inclined to follow the
majority opinion."
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